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I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (Michie 
2001). This Court has granted the parties' Joint Petition for Permission to Appeal 
Interlocutory Order, dated September 26, 2001, and will also hear the issues determined 
to be final by the Sixth Judicial District Court in its Order dated August 23, 2001. See 
Errata Addendum and Supplemental Addendum (hereinafter "Add.") at 2040-2041, 
2057-2058. 
II. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The issues raised in this appeal and cross-appeal are stated below. Each of those 
issues was preserved for appeal in the Parties Joint Motion for Rule 54(b) Certification 
and joint petition for interlocutory appeal. (Record on Appeal (hereinafter "Rec." at 
2070-2075.) 
Appeal 
1. Whether the trial court properly concluded that Appellant's claim for 
breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
arising from Appellant's voluntary resignation from GCE failed as a matter of law. 
2. Whether the trial court properly concluded that Appellant's claim for 
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing arising out of the stock 
repurchase agreement between Appellant and Grand Canyon Expedition Co. ("GCE") 
failed as a matter of law. 
3. Whether the trial court properly concluded that Appellant may not state a 
claim for punitive damages under his contract cause of action. 
4. Whether the trial court properly concluded as a matter of law that Appellant 
was not entitled to attorneys1 fees as consequential damages. 
5. Whether the trial court properly denied as futile Appellant's motion to 
amend his complaint for a third time to add a cause of action for unjust enrichment. 
Cross-Appeal 
6. Whether the trial court improperly denied the motion for summary 
judgment on Appellant's claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing based upon a refund of taxes paid to GCE years after Appellant's separation from 
GCE. 
7. Whether the trial court improperly failed to strike the affidavit and exclude 
from evidence the testimony of Appellant's accounting expert because his testimony 
could not be helpful to the trier of fact. 
8. Whether the trial court improperly failed to dismiss the individual 
Appellees because they are not parties to any contract with Appellant. 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Appellees/Cross-Appellants agree with the standards of review as articulated in 
Appellant's brief for issues raised on appeal. For issues raised on Cross-appeal, 
Appellees identify the following standards of review: 
• Whether the trial court improperly denied GCE's Motion for Summary 
Judgment on Appellant's claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing based upon a refund of taxes paid to GCE years after Appellant's separation from 
GCE. 
Standard of Review: In examining a trial court's disposition of a summary 
judgment motion, the trial court's legal conclusions are reviewed for correctness, without 
any deference to the trial court. See Estate Landscape & Snow Removal Specialists, Inc. 
v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 844 P.2d 322, 325 (Utah 1992); Marton Remodeling 
v. Jensen, 706 P.2d 607, 609 (Utah 1985). "This nondeferential standard of review also 
applies to the threshold issue of whether there are no material issues of fact such that 
summary judgment is proper." Brown v. Weis, 871 P.2d 552, 558 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
• Whether the trial court improperly failed to strike the affidavit and exclude 
from evidence the testimony of Appellant's accounting expert because his testimony 
could not be helpful to the trier of fact. 
Standard of Review: A trial court's decision to admit or to exclude expert 
testimony is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See Patey v. Lainhart ^ 33, 977 P.2d 
1193 (Utah 1999); Steffensen v. Smith's Mgmt. Corp., 862 P.2d 1342, 1347 (Utah 1993). 
• Whether the trial court improperly failed to dismiss the individual 
Appellees because they are not parties to any contract with Appellant. 
Standard of Review: Because the trial court was dealing with undisputed facts, its 
failure to dismiss the individual Appellees amounted to a ruling of law, which should be 
reviewed for correctness, without any deference to the trial court. See Estate Landscape 
& Snow Removal Specialists, 844 P.2d at 325; Marton Remodeling, 706 P.2d at 609. 
IV. DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, ETC. 
None. 
V. STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS 
In order to assist the Court in understanding the legal issues relevant to this appeal, 
Appellants provide the following statements of facts: 
A. Parties and Background 
1. Appellee Grand Canyon Expedition Co. ("GCE") is a Utah corporation 
engaged in the business of running river rafting trips in the Grand Canyon. (Rec. at 403, 
427.) 
2. Appellant Marc Smith is a former officer, director and shareholder of GCE. 
(Rec. at 427.) 
3. The Individual Appellees are or were shareholders in GCE.1 Michael 
Denoyer ("Denoyer") and Martin Mathis ("Mathis") are also officers and directors of 
GCE. (Rec. at 426-427.) 
4. GCE was formed in late 1986 to purchase some of the assets of a similarly 
named company, Grand Canyon Expeditions, Inc. ("Grand Canyon") and Ronald R. 
Smith Co. Grand Canyon was owned by Appellant's brother, Ronald R. Smith ("Ron 
Smith"). (Rec. at 402-403, 426.) 
1
 Donald Saunders was originally a defendant in this action. Mr. Saunders died on 
December 29, 2000. On March 15, 2001, the Court granted Appellant's Motion for 
Substitution of Parties, and ordered that Glen Perez, the personal representative of the Estate 
of Donald Saunders, and the Estate of Donald Saunders, be substituted as defendants in the 
stead of defendant Donald Saunders. (Rec. at 2062-2065.) 
B. Appellant's Employment with GCE 
1. The Employment Agreement 
5. Appellant became the vice president of operations for GCE and signed an 
employment agreement (the "Employment Agreement") with the Company. (Rec. at 
324-331,425.) Denoyer and Mathis executed identical agreements. (Rec. at 425.) 
6. The Employment Agreement provided that Appellant was to remain in the 
employ of GCE from January 1, 1987 to December 31, 1987. The employment term 
could be renewed at the request of GCE and mutual consent of the parties. (Rec. at 330, 
425.) 
7. The Employment Agreement provided that GCE could terminate 
Appellant's employment "at any time, with or without cause." (Rec. at 329, 424.) 
8. The Employment Agreement also contained a noncompetition clause under 
which Appellant agreed not to own or participate in any company that ran river trips in 
the Grand Canyon for a period of two years after the termination of his employment with 
the company. (Rec. at 327-328, 424.) 
2. The Buy-Sell Agreement 
9. Appellant also signed an agreement (the "Buy-Sell Agreement") requiring 
him to sell and GCE to buy his stock upon the termination of his employment with the 
Company. (Rec. at 288-293, 424.) Denoyer and Mathis signed identical agreements. 
(Rec. at 425.) 
10. The Buy-Sell Agreement provided that if GCE bought the stock more than 
four years after the date of execution of the Buy-Sell Agreement, GCE would pay 
Appellant 140 percent of the net book value of Appellant's stock. (Rec. at 292, 424.) 
11. The Buy-Sell Agreement further provided that the departing shareholder's 
repurchase payment was to be calculated "conclusively" by the Company's accountant 
based upon generally accepted accounting principles ("GAAP"). (Rec. at 292.) 
C. Separation of Appellant's Employment at GCE 
12. Due to numerous deficiencies in Appellant's performance, his relationship 
with the other officers and shareholders of GCE became strained. (Rec. at 418-423.) 
13. In June 1992, Appellant met with Denoyer and Mathis to discuss these 
problems. (Id.) 
14. At this meeting, Mathis and Denoyer expressed to Appellant their 
frustrations and told him that the relationship was not working as it should. Appellant's 
conduct, however, did not improve. (Id.) 
15. About this time, Denoyer determined that Appellant would have to leave 
the Company. Denoyer wanted to wait until the end of the season to address the matter 
rather than disrupt the Company during the season. (Id.) 
16. Appellant, however, continued to raise the issue and demanded a resolution 
of the conflict. (Id.) 
17. Consequently, in July 1992, Denoyer told Appellant that he would have to 
leave the Company. (Id.) 
18. After learning of Denoyer's decision, Appellant called Don Saunders in an 
attempt to reverse that decision. (Id.) 
19. Because it was clear to Appellant that Saunders would support Denoyer's 
decision, Appellant negotiated a severance payment in addition to the sale of his stock in 
GCE, as mandated by the Buy-Sell Agreement. (Rec. at 417.) 
20. Appellant also negotiated a waiver of the noncompetition clause in the 
Employment Agreement. (Id.) 
21. Appellant also negotiated to have the termination of his employment treated 
as a resignation, rather than an involuntary termination. (Rec. at 217, 417.) 
22. Appellant's agreement with GCE was memorialized in a writing (the 
"Separation Agreement") signed by Denoyer on behalf of GCE and by Appellant. (Add. 
at 1495-98.) 
23. Appellant received the severance payment and a down payment for the 
purchase price of his stock in GCE, which he negotiated, and tendered his stock 
certificates to the Company. (Rec. at 417.) 
24. Appellant also received and accepted periodic payments for the balance of 
the purchase price of his GCE stock. Appellant continued to be paid and accepted 
payments for years after this lawsuit was filed. (Id.) 
D. Accounting Issues and the Net Book Value of GCE 
1. Background 
25. GCE's accountant from the company's inception in 1986 to and including 
the time of Appellant's separation of employment in July 1992 was Nyle Willis. Willis is 
a certified public accountant who resides and practices in Kanab, Utah. (Rec. at 1737.85-
1737.86, 1737.120.) 
26. Willis was responsible, among other things, for preparing GCE's periodic 
and annual balance sheets, its income tax returns, and the financial reports required by the 
National Park Service ("NPS") in connection with GCE's river-running operation. (Rec. 
at 1737.85.) 
2. Covenant Not-to-Compete 
27. In connection with its acquisition of certain assets from the old Grand 
Canyon, GCE required the owner of the old company, Ron Smith, to execute a covenant 
not-to-compete. (Rec. at 1182-1183, 1418-1419.) 
28. In consideration for his covenant not-to-compete, GCE agreed to pay Ron 
Smith SI million over a period of four years. Mr. Willis booked this covenant not-to-
compete and amortized it over its four-year term. (Rec. at 1182, 1423.) 
29. Appellant benefited from a reduction of his personal tax liability each year 
as a result of the amortization of this covenant. (Rec. at 1871.) 
30. The arms-length transaction between GCE and Grand Canyon did not 
assign a value to the river running permit that was to be assigned to GCE. (Rec. at 1363.) 
This was a function of the fact that National Park Service regulations in effect at that time 
did not permit a transfer of river running permits for substantial consideration. (Rec. at 
1165, TJ4.) In any event, this permit was set to expire in a few years. (Rec. at 1176-
1179.) 
3. Sobek/White Water Transaction 
31. GCE began negotiations in 1990 for the acquisition of certain assets of 
another river running company, Sobek/White Water ("Sobek"). An agreement was 
reached in 1990 that was closed in September 1991. (Rec. at 1825-1839, 1872.) 
32. This transaction involved a number of accounting entries made by Willis in 
1991 which are disputed by Appellant. These entries are described in great detail in the 
recordbelow. (Rec. at 1805-1811, 1870-1872.) 
33. The 1991 year-end accounting records of GCE were prepared by Willis 
months before Appellant's separation of employment. Willis had no knowledge of any 
potential separation of employment or stock purchase by Appellant at the time he 
prepared those records. (Rec. at 1737.114.) 
34. Appellant's accountant, Derk Rasmussen, admitted that the treatment of 
these assets did not necessarily violate GAAP. He also stated that Appellant benefited 
from a reduction in tax liability in this Subchapter S corporation at the end of 1991 as a 
direct result of the amortization of certain of those assets. (Rec. at 1871.) 
35. The Sobek transaction resulted in additional stock that was distributed 
among GCE's shareholders, including Appellant. (Rec. at 1870-1871.) 
36. The remaining accounting issues raised on appeal are also described in 
detail in the record below. (Rec. at 1737.114-1737.119, 1870-1872.) 
4. Arizona Tax Refund 
37. From its inception in 1986 to and including the time of Appellant's 
departure in July 1992, GCE paid an admissions tax (the "Admissions Tax") to the State 
of Arizona for river trips in Arizona. This tax was passed on to the customers of GCE 
through an addition to their trip fare. (Rec. at 1737.50, 1737.114.) 
38. The Admissions Tax was challenged by another river rafting company, 
Moki Mac River Expeditions, Inc. ("Moki Mac"). See Department of Revenue v. Moki 
Mac River Expeditions, Inc., 773 P.2d 474 (Ariz. App. 1989). After a series of 
administrative hearings and decisions, in January 1989, the Arizona Court of Appeals 
upheld the Admissions Tax. The Arizona Supreme Court denied certification. 
39. In 1990, GCE became embroiled in a dispute with ADOR over payment of 
a sales tax for food purchased outside Arizona, but consumed in Arizona (the "Sales 
Tax"). GCE retained Arizona tax counsel, Ann Dumenil, who prepared a protest 
regarding this Sales Tax issue. Dumenil also included a request for a refund of overpaid 
admissions taxes as other taxpayers were still challenging the validity of this tax on river 
running companies. GCE's tax counsel advised the company, however, that it likely 
would lose the Admissions Tax issue and, in any event, any refund probably would have 
to be returned to customers who had been billed for the tax as part of their trip payments. 
The record below includes correspondence between Dumenil and GCE concerning this 
issue. (Rec. at 1737.107-1737.114, 1868-1870.) 
40. Appellant was aware long before the termination of his employment that 
GCE had applied for a refund of the Admissions Tax. In fact, Appellant was kept 
apprised throughout his tenure at GCE of the status of this appeal. (Rec. at 1794, 1870.) 
41. Significantly, GCE's accountant, Willis, was very familiar with the 
Admissions Tax issue long before Appellant's separation and buyout. Despite his 
knowledge of the refund request, it was not identified as an asset on the books of GCE in 
1990 when the protest was filed, at any time between then and the time of Appellant's 
separation from employment in July 1992 or at any time until the refund was made in 
1995 and 1996. Willis did not consider the tax protest to be a GAAP asset that should 
have been included in Appellant's buyout regardless of its status at that time. (Rec. at 
1807-1809,1868.) 
42. At the time of Appellant's departure from GCE in July 1992, GCE was 
continuing to collect and pay the Admissions Tax to the State of Arizona and expected to 
continue paying the tax without abatement or refund. (Rec. at 1737.48, 1737.109.) 
43. On August 21, 1991, Denoyer called Dumenil to advise her that he did not 
want to continue litigating the issue of a refund of the Admissions Tax. This call is 
confirmed by Dumenil, as well as by a handwritten note on GCE's copy of Dumenil's 
correspondence of July 15, 1991, which states: "Mike (Denoyer) called her Aug 21, and 
we will not request refund." (Rec. at 1737.12-1737.13, 1737.111.) 
44. Dumenil did not formally withdraw the protest nor did she advise GCE that 
she had not withdrawn it. Shortly after Appellant's separation from GCE, Denoyer 
received a letter from Dumenil dated August 20, 1992 advising him that a hearing had 
been scheduled. (Rec. at 1737.9-1737.10, 1737.21-1737.22, 1737.48, 1737.110-
1737.111.) 
45. Dumenil's letter noted and confirmed the earlier discussions between 
Denoyer and herself wherein Denoyer stated that GCE had no wish to continue to pursue 
a possible refund claim. She then indicated that she had not formally withdrawn the 
protest in the event another river-running company won that legal issue. (Rec. at 1737.9-
1737.10, 1737.21-1737.22, 1737,48,1737.110.) 
46. Dumenil concluded by reiterating the significant problems confronting 
GCE in obtaining a refund. She asked Denoyer to reconfirm that GCE did not want to 
pursue a refund and his instruction to withdraw the refund claim. (Rec. at 1737.9-
1737.10, 1737.21, 1737.48, 1737.110.) 
47. Denoyer telephoned Dumenil to confirm that he did not wish to continue to 
pursue any possible refund claim, and he again requested withdrawal of the protest. This 
communication is confirmed both in a handwritten note attached to GCE's copy of the 
letter as well as by a memorandum prepared by Dumenil. (Rec. at 1737.7, 1737.9-
1737.10, 1737.21,1737.110.) 
48. Dumenil evidently did not follow Denoyer's instructions. Instead, she 
recalled canceling the scheduled hearing without formally withdrawing the claim for a 
refund of overpaid taxes. This is reflected in her handwritten note of September 13, 1995 
appearing at the bottom of her August 25, 1992 memorandum. (Rec. at 1737.7, 1737.20-
1737.21, 1737.47-1737.48, 1737.109-1737.110.) 
49. Dumenil did not advise GCE that she had decided on this course of action. 
(Rec. at 1737.21, 1737.47-1737.48, 1737.109.) 
50. At or about this same time, a challenge to the Admissions Tax was raised 
by yet another river-running company, Wilderness World, Inc. ("Wilderness World"). 
This case eventually was reported as Wilderness World, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 
895 P.2d 108 (Ariz. 1995). 
51. Wilderness World's appeal of a deficiency assessment was denied by the 
Arizona Board of Tax Appeals. Wilderness World then filed a complaint for a refund in 
the Arizona Tax Court. The tax court granted the Department of Revenue's motion for 
summary judgment on October 13, 1992. The tax court relied upon the precedent 
established in DOR v. Moki Mac River Expeditions, Inc., 773 P.2d 474 (Ariz. App. 
1989). Ms. Dumenil had earlier advised GCE of this pending result in her letter of 
August 20, 1992. (Rec. at 1737.9-1737.10, 1737.109.) 
52. The October 13, 1992 decision of the Arizona Tax Court simply confirmed 
GCE's obligation to pay the Admissions Tax to the State of Arizona. (Rec. at 1737.109.) 
53. Wilderness World, however, appealed the Arizona Tax Court's judgment to 
the Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One. The Arizona Court of Appeals reversed the 
tax court, finding that the Admissions Tax did not apply to Wilderness World. 
Wilderness World v. Department of Revenue, 882 P.2d 1281, 1283-84 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
1993). 
54. The Arizona Supreme Court then heard the appeal of ADOR. In its 
opinion, filed on April 18, 1995, the Arizona Supreme Court found that Wilderness 
World did not meet the statutory prerequisites for application of the Admissions Tax. 
Wilderness World, 895 P.2d at 111-12 (Ariz. 1995). 
55. The appeals of the initial rulings in the Wilderness World case did not arise 
until well after Appellant's departure from GCE. (Id. at 110; Rec. at 1737.108.) 
56. GCE continued to pay the Admissions Tax to the State of Arizona until at 
or about the time it was notified it was entitled to a refund. This notification did not 
occur until September 1995. (Rec. at 1737.20-1737.21, 1737.47-1737.48, 1737.108.) 
57. GCE received its first refund check from the State of Arizona from its 
counsel by letter dated November 1, 1995. Three other checks were subsequently 
received through counsel or through the State of Arizona on November 9, 1995, January 
16, 1996, and May 29, 1996. (Rec. at 1737.47, 1737.107-1737.108.) 
58. The total refund received by GCE from the State of Arizona was 
approximately $1 million. Of this amount, pursuant to ADOR's interpretation of Arizona 
law in effect at the time of the refunds, GCE attempted to refund approximately $280,000 
to its customers. Some of these refunds were returned to GCE as undeliverable to the 
recipient and the money has been retained on GCE's books as a liability until these 
customers can be located. (Rec. at 1737.47, 1737.107.) 
E. Procedural Status and Proceedings Below 
59. In 1994, Appellant initiated this action against the Appellees, as well as his 
brother and his brother's children. Among other causes of action, Appellant claimed that 
his brother had breached a contact to give him an interest in the old Grand Canyon. 
Appellant later dismissed his claims against his niece and nephew, and still later his 
claims against his brother. In 1998, he amended his complaint to allege breach of 
contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing against the 
present Appellees. (Rec. at 1-15, 25-59.) 
60. ..'.:••. ., .
 r .. .. • ::], . inpiv :w:i\i v.;aim 
in Ic ite 1998 B \ Mei i i< >i i 11 :i< ii i - ' ' ' > ! ^ ' iR- / . , - v ^ r - -
trial court d ismissed all of Appe l l an t ' s c laims except to the extent that lie stated a ±.SJA\ 
1 01 breach of UK, impuea covenant as it related to the Buy-Sell Agreemen t . Dur ing the 
pei idei icy of tl lat i :i ic: l i ai i, ! \ ppellai it i aised, f oi tl ic fn st tii i ie, 1 lis 1:1: leoi ) > 1:1: lat A ppel lees 
breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing through account ing ioi 
certain assets in the Sobek transaction and 'for the refund of taxes paid to the staie i-f 
Ai iz( u ii t(tl ic ' i i; ; .< n u i I i i> I U di n n 1"). 0 : : : ' i' -831 83-2 ) ; 
6 1 . "• ^ncl lees subsequent ly moved for summary ]\ ldgn lent c i :i the ii i lplied 
L ^ enant J a i m s relating to the Buv-Sell Agreement in early lc)99, ! Mime the pendency 
' ^ e c o n ( : . ; . o i i u i i l . \ | : r : . „ . „ , 1 , i . l . , . ; .„ai Xppuiees were unjust l \ e n r i c h e d ^ w^ 
LiiiiL to at tempt to - .ale - u J ; ^kiini. ^Ku,. at i u55 -1057 . j 
62. Appel lant based his account ing claims entirely upon the tes t imony of a so-
calle d ;:: .ccoi n iting expei I:, D : i 1 -:: 1 tasi i n issei i , ! appellees i i IOV ed to sti il ::e ]\ i r , R asi :i n issc: i i 's 
tes t imony as irrelevant and unhelpful . (Rec . at 1156-1196.) 
63 . By M e m o r a n d u m Decis ion dated March 20, 2000 , the trial court dismissed 
all of A ppellai it' s claii i is sa/v e 1 iis claii i is f oi 1: i aa :::1 I of tl i ::• i i i l p l i ed c o aen: lai it c f g o o d f iaith 
and fair dealing in connection with the Sobek accounting matters and with respect to the 
Arizona Tax Refund? (Rec. at 1747-1755.) 
2
 The trial court denied Appellees' motion to strike the testimony of Mr. Rasmussen. 
64. Appellees then filed their third and final motion for summary judgment 
seeking dismissal of Appellant's remaining claim for breach of the implied covenant 
based upon the Sobek disputes and the Arizona Tax Refund, as well as his claims for 
attorneys' fees and punitive damages. The trial court granted Appellees' motion with 
respect to implied covenant claims arising from the accounting for the Sobek transaction 
and with respect to attorneys' fees and punitive damages. The trial court denied the 
motion as to Appellant's claim for breach of the implied covenant in connection with the 
Arizona Tax refund. This appeal ensued. 
VI. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
A. Appeal 
The trial court properly granted summary judgment on Appellant's claims for 
breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing as 
they relate to his employment because the undisputed facts showed that Appellant 
reached an accord and satisfaction with Appellees as to those claims. Alternatively, 
Appellant waived or released those claims. In addition, the undisputed facts showed that 
Appellant was an at-will employee by reason of either the Employment Agreement or the 
common law. Appellant adduced no relevant evidence to rebut the common law 
presumption of at-will employment. 
3
 Appellees also argued below that ample cause existed for the decision to terminate 
Appellant's employment with GCE. The trial court found that factual issues existed regarding 
termination for cause and that issue is not being pursued in this appeal. 
1 1 le ti ial • : : 1 11 t pi opei 1> gi ai ited sin i n i lai y jt idgi i lent on Appellant s claims for 
calculation of the net book value ui ^ C E , including the Sobek accounting, because the 
undisputed facts show that Appellant waived any claim or is estopped from asserting any 
claii i 11 le 1 lad f oi alleged i i riscalct llatioi i based I lpoi i GCE* s accoi n itii ig pi actice s 
Moreover, the undisputed facts show that the net book value of the GCE stock was 
determined by GCE's independent accountant, as provided for in the Buy-Sell 
Agreement, and in accordance witn v.<A.\;\ 
' 1 1 le ti ial :c I u t pi opei 1;; ' disi nissed ^ppellai it' s claii n is f :)i pi n litiv e dai i nages ai id 
attorneys' fees because, as a matter of law, Appellant is not entitled to such relief. 
Plaintii i > L hums, sounding m contract t\r not give rise to punitive damages and 
\ n . i i .M, .i.: .. 
case, attorneys5 fees are not appropriate. The inai court aLo pioperK denied Appellant 
leave to amend his complaint to add a claim foi i iiijust enrichment based upon GCE's 
receipt of ai id ace :»"i n itii ig fc i tl le \,:t izoi la I 'ax Reft n id because tl lat cause of action would 
have been immediately subject to dismissal as a matter of law. 
~ Cross-Appeal 
11le trial i ,.4.r: improper!} ianai u; gruni nummary judgment against Appellant on 
ihi \ n / o n a Tax Refund. Appellant reached an accord with GCE on this mattei just as he 
(in; *.;
 ;:i wiii^r accounting matters. Additionally, this refund request was a remote 
contingency ai id i i :)t a G < \ \ I * asset at tl le til i ic of \ pp ellai it's separatioi I I it oi i i GCE in 
July 1992. Moreover, GCE's officers believed that the refund request had been 
dismissed. Therefore, Appellant could not possibly have had a reasonable expectation in 
July 1992 that the refund request would have been included in his buyout. He also could 
not have had a justified expectation of sharing in the refund request if it became an asset 
at some future time because the Buy-Sell Agreement was terminated. As a result of the 
termination of the Buy-Sell Agreement, Appellees had no continuing contractual or other 
obligation to Appellant that can form the basis for his claim of breach of the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing based on post-termination events. 
The trial court also improperly failed to exclude the expert testimony of 
Appellant's accountant, Derk Rasmussen. Mr. Rasmussen's testimony did not meet the 
threshold standards for admission of the Utah Rules of Evidence. Finally, the trial court 
should have dismissed the individual Appellees because they are not parties to any 
contract with Appellant. 
VII. ARGUMENT 
A. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED APPELLANT'S BREACH 
OF CONTRACT CLAIM BECAUSE THE PARTIES REACHED AN 
AGREEMENT TO TERMINATE HIS EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP 
WITH GCE. 
1. Appellant has Relinquished Anv Rights Under the Employment 
Agreement or Otherwise. 
In its January 15, 1999 Memorandum Decision, the trial court dismissed 
Appellant's breach of contract claim, concluding that Appellant reached an accord with 
GCE terminating his employment relationship. Appellant appeals this decision, 
pleaded 01 pi o v o :J 
a,. Appellant's Claims are Ban ed by the Doctrine of Accoi "d and 
Satisfaction. 
* c 1:01 d ai id satisfactioi 1 is pi o^  • ei i v • 1 lei i tl le facts si low 1:1 lat the parties tc a 
contract agree to a different perfomiance in substitution for the performance required by 
the original contract. ProMax Dev. V. Raile, 998 P.2d 254, 259 (Utah 2000^ ^r-
successfully I aise tl le clef en.se of accoi d ai id satis• :.•..• 
- ' or a bona fide dispute over the amount due; 2) a payment offered in 
full settlement of the entire dispute; and, 3) acceptance of the payment as full settlement 
o! u.c disputed amount. Ki. fil ing Marton Remodeling v. Jensen , .. ; ..^ •>) 
Even taking the facts in the light most favorable to Appellant, the trial court 
properly found an accord and satisfaction as to Appellant's employment claims. 
Appelk ii it sigi led tl le Sepai atioi i A,gi eei i lent se^ - ei i tc ten da;; 's aftei 1 lis iiscussic i :i ' - itl I 
Denoyer about separation of his employment and after his subsequent discussions with 
4
 Appellant argues that Appellees waived accord and satisfaction as an affirmative 
defense because it was not formally pleaded in their answer. Appellant has overlooked the fact 
that Appellees had not yet served their answer to the ^ I ' : K ! complaint puiMiant to an 
agreement between LOUIM/I i :ui *. Appellees may still plead accord and satisfaction as an 
affirmative defense. Moreover , Appellees clearly raised this defense in connection with their 
motion for summary judgment . Because Appellant consented to the consideration of this 
defense on summary judgment , technical amendment of Appellees ' answer is not required to 
include the defense of accord and satisfaction. See, e.g. , Poulsen v. Poulsen, 672 P.2d 97, 98 
(Utah 1983). See also, Jones v. Dutra Constr. Co . , 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 4 1 1 , 414 (Cal C \pp . 
1997); Lancaster v. C .F . & 1 Steel Corp . , 548 P.2d 914, 916 (Colo. 1976). 
Saunders in which he attempted to retain his employment. Among other things, the 
Separation Agreement provided that, 
"in lieu of any other amounts or benefits which may be due 
from [GCE] as provided in the Employment Agreement or 
otherwise, including but not limited to bonus, additional 
salary, commissions and health benefits, [GCE] shall pay 
[Appellant] the sum of Thirty-Seven Thousand Nine Hundred 
Forty Dollars and Eighty Eight Cents ($37,940.88) which 
represents severance pay." 
Add. at 1497 (emphasis added). The Separation Agreement also provided that GCE 
would waive its right to enforce the non-competition provisions of the Employment 
Agreement, and that Appellant would resign as both an officer and an employee of GCE. 
Id. There is no dispute that Appellant signed the Separation Agreement and accepted the 
severance payment and other benefits of the agreement. 
The Separation Agreement is devastating to Appellant's claim that there was no 
accord and satisfaction of his employment claims.5 The language of the Separation 
Agreement clearly shows a dispute as to the amount owed, since it refers to amounts and 
benefits that "may be due" under the Employment Agreement "or otherwise." It further 
shows the offer and acceptance of the severance payment6 in "in lieu of any other amount 
or benefits which maybe due." Id. Because the Separation Agreement demonstrates all 
5
 As discussed below, it is also fatal to his claims arising from the Buy-Sell Agreement. 
See Section VII.B.I., infra. 
6
 Appellant also received other valuable consideration in the form of GCE's agreement 
to waive the non-competition clause in the Employment Agreement and the characterization of 
his discharge as a voluntary resignation. See Add. at 1496-97. 
three elements of accord and sdiisiacuoiu i^. : ut -u; ,> wi^nnssal of Appellant ? 
I 
x
^ rrcliam nreues that because he did not know facts sufficient to alert him as to 
in net book value of GCE was calculated to establish the purchase price of his 
stock, tiiUL u-u... - .a\e been an unliquidated claim, and tl lere coi ild it lot 1 la > e beei 1 ai i 
aerniil .nid salislaclion ApprlLinl \ an»nmcn1 fails for several reasons. First, it misses 
the point of Judge Mclffs ruling on accord and satisfactioi; ii the context of Appellant's 
employment claims. The caieuiatiin; «•. Appellant uivout uiiwi, WK O U V A L ; 
claims. Appellant believed that he had been wrongfully terminated fay the compuii), 
indeed, the undisputed e\ idence is that he attempted to keep his job, arguing that the 
company 1 lad i 10 i igl it tc tei i i in late 1 lis ei i iplo> ' i nei it 1 1 le ai i :ic i n it of ! lis en iplo> i i lei it 
•: ; •••Iv.'thi: ;;ri:^ *:-.; out of the Employment Agreement or common law, was an 
unliquidated clain i Nevertheless, Appellant accepted the severance pay "in lieu of any 
other amounts di le asprovuu -, :.nM i^ •> — n. .-\greemen .:,. 
a< * *>•• n , - ?' ./ i .\* J and satisfaction can and often does arise n i 
connection with a claim the amount of which is unknown oi uncertain. See, e.g., 
Sugarhouse Fin. Co. v. Anderson, . ' M« *•'iere .:IUK riving 
claii i i is i ii; icei tail i assei it t a • zlefii l i te p a y i i lei it gives rise to accord ai id satisfactioi I); Ii 11 e 
Grimm, 784 P.2d 1238, 1244-1245 (Utah Ct. App. 1^9) iaccord found where payment 
made for uncertain claims), cert, denied, 795 P,2d 11Q8 (I tali 1990). Consequently, the 
fact that Appellant did not fully appreciate the alleged value of his claim does not allow 
him to avoid an accord defense. 
Appellant also argues that the Separation Agreement cannot evidence an accord 
and satisfaction because it does not contain language indicating that it was made in full 
satisfaction of all claims. Appellant is, of course, simply wrong on the facts. The 
Separation Agreement expressly states that GCE's payment of the severance pay was in 
lieu of all other amounts owed under the Employment Agreement or otherwise. 
Moreover, as a matter of law, no written agreement or specific language is required to 
show an accord and satisfaction. Golden Key Realty v. Mantas, 699 P.2d 730, 732 (Utah 
1985). Comparison to a recent Utah case is instructive. 
In Dishinger v. Potter, 47 P.3d 76 (Utah Ct. App. 2001), cert, denied, 40 P.3d 1135 
(2001), tenants made payment of a disputed rental amount with a notation of "new base 
rent" on the check. The landlord negotiated the check after sending the tenant a notice of 
default and a notice to pay the remaining rent due or quit the premises. The landlord then 
continued to negotiate checks for the lower rental amount during the following year. Id. 
at 77-78. At trial, the jury found that the landlord, by cashing the checks for the disputed 
amount, had entered into an accord and satisfaction with the tenant. The landlord 
appealed this decision, asserting that the mere cashing of the checks did not demonstrate 
a subjective intent on her part to accept the lower rental amount in full satisfaction of the 
disputed rent. Id. at 78-79. The Utah Court of Appeals held that, even without the 
tenant's express statement that the checks were paid in full satisfaction of the rental debt, 
the tenant had established the elements of accord and satisfaction. Id. at 82. 
Iii tl lis case, the facts w eigl i even more heavily in i a\ 01 of accoi d and satisfaction. 
primary investor, to reverse the discharge decision. Unable to do so, Appellant 
negotiated the termination of his employment on far more favorable terms, apparently 
belie\ ii ig 1 ic v < as ei ititled to i i 101 e tl lai i GCE belie * - eel 1 le w as ei ititled to \ ppellai it 
received severance pay, a benefit to which he was not otherwise entitled, of over $37,000. 
In addition, GCE also agreed to waive its right to enforce the non-coinpetitioi. provi^ons 
"f .„ employment Agreement .a... ..
 f n .tt;.. u> resign as an employee oi uCL, 
Ii- : ' - •- lie i i' " of ai iv c tl le i 
payment Appellant was entitled to under the Employment Agreement, or any other 
agreemen* ^ +v,o0™ Appellant executed tlle Separation Agreement and accepted all 
These facts clearly show a disputed or uncertain amount that Appellant claimed 
GCE owed him. They further show a payment and other consideration tendered in fi ill 
settlei i lei it of tl ic ei itii e elispi ite ai id ac ceptai ice b> ; Vppellai it :»f tl lat pa;} l l lei it I Ia\ ii ig 
demonstrated all the elements of accord and satisfaction, the trial court's grant of 
Mm man judgment on this basis should be affirmed. 
b. 
For similar reasons, the Separation Agreement conclusively demonstrates 
that Appellant waived any rights under the Employment Agreement or at comnu n 'aw. 
As stated in Appellant's brief, waiver is ;,,.,. aiieniioiiu. u. ..nquishment ui u K.iown right. 
Soters, Inc. \ Deseret Federal ha\. ^ i^uai; A ^ a. 4 ' r " ; i v " ii :i-<- i - i 
Waiver is made up of the following three elements: 1) an existing right; 2) knowledge of 
its existence; and, 3) and intention to relinquish the right. Id. The intent to relinquish a 
right can be implied from conduct if the parties conduct "'unequivocally evince[s] an 
intent to waive or [is] at least. . . inconsistent with any other intent.'" Beckstead v. 
Deseret Roofing Co., 831 P.2d 130, 133 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
Appellant was aware of a number of rights he could have enforced in 1992, 
including the right to seek enforcement of his claimed rights under the Employment 
Agreement or "otherwise." Nevertheless, he did not seek to enforce those rights; rather, 
he agreed with GCE that he would accept the severance payment and other benefits. In 
fact, he memorialized his intention to relinquish these rights by signing the Separation 
Agreement in which he received this consideration in lieu of any other payment due 
under the Employment Agreement or otherwise. (Rec. at 1495-1498.) However 
described, the substance of what Appellant did was to give up his rights under the 
Employment Agreement or otherwise in exchange for valuable consideration. As a 
result, the trial court's grant of summary judgment should be upheld on this basis as well. 
2. Appellant Cannot Show Breach of the Employment Agreement 
The trial court relied upon a theory of accord and satisfaction to dispose of 
Appellant's employment claims. Although the trial court declined to grant summary 
judgment to Appellees on any other grounds, the trial court could and clearly should have 
granted summary judgment as well as on the basis that plaintiff was an at-will employee 
whose employment could be terminated with or without cause. 
at-will employee. (Rec. at 324-331.) The continuing validity of this Employment 
Agreement was demonstrated by, among other things, the Separation Agreement. In any 
e\ :M it, tl ic i esult is tl ic sai 1 le i egardless of w 1 iet! ici tl ic Employment Agreement was still 
valid oi not at the time of Appellant's separation of ei i lploy :i i :iei it \ ssi n i ling tl lat tl ic 
employment agreement had expired of us own terms and had not been renewed by GCE, 
Appellant wo..... ;,.<... ,J*A^ ; ecome an at-will eniploxee. Hodgson v. Bunzl Utah, Inc., 
844 I * 2d 331 3.5,5 (I Jtal i 15 )\ )'l) (at ", > ' ill ei :i iplo;; > i i iei it pi esi n i led at lav • ) I ] iei :"'1 * 7as i lot a 
scintilla of relevant evidence adduced by Appellant to rebut the common law" 
presumption that he was an at-will employee.7 Appellant has never produced a single 
\ r t ;d tl ie i lati i! e of 
his employment relationship with GCE. In short, the only evidence supporting 
Appellant's common law theory of breach of contact is his subjective belief that he could 
,:i. - ..: employee's <uih , _t ' - rL;u.: i;. m^un^ient as a maner 
of law to raise a genuine i^biie oi fact as to ai-wi < * Nuigsor, \ ^ • * 
P.2d 333-34 (siimmary judgment properly granted despite plaintiffs subjective belief that 
she was not an at ~.\\\\ iv\cc j. JmL, ... .*' ,;,.] not err IK.OW bc^ui^e he i^ u.i ,\ -e 
" i'-*\<ie Mclff suggests in his Order that Appellant may have been able at trial to present 
rebutting the at-will presumption. (Rec. at 835). The fact remains, however, that 
Appellant presented no evidence sufficient to rebut the presumption, and summary judgment 
should have been granted on that basis. 
claim had been subject to accord and satisfaction, but his dictum regarding the 
employment agreement and Appellant's at-will status is unsupported by the evidence. If 
this Court is unpersuaded by accord and satisfaction or waiver, Appellant's continuing 
status as an at-will employee provides an independent and sufficient basis to justify 
dismissal of his employment claims as a matter of law. 
3. The Termination of Appellant's Employment Was Not in Bad Faith, 
Nor Did It Frustrate His Justified Expectations. 
Finally, Appellant argues that Appellees breached the implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing in terminating the Employment Agreement. Appellant simply 
lacks any evidence to succeed on the merits of this claim. 
The obligation imposed by the implied covenant of good faith is that the parties to 
a contract will exercise their contractual rights reasonably and in good faith. Olympus 
Hills Shopping Or., Ltd. v. Smith's Food & Drug Ctrs., Inc., 889 P.2d 445, 450 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1994), cert, denied, 899 P.2d 1231 (1995). The covenant essentially provides that 
each party to a contract will adhere to the "agreed upon common purpose" of the contract 
and will not do anything to frustrate the "justified expectations" of the other party. Id. at 
889 P.2d 451 (citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205 cmt a. (1979)). The 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing cannot, however, be invoked to alter the 
express terms of a contract. Nor can it be used to establish new, independent rights or 
duties not agreed upon by the parties. Sanderson v. First Sec. Leasing Co., 844 P.2d 303, 
308 (Utah 1991) (quoted in Seare v. University of Utah Sch. of Medicine, 882 P.2d 673, 
678 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), cert, denied, 892 P.2d 13 (1995)). For example, the implied 
covenant does i lot operate to i eqi lire ca/i lse to ten i linate an ei nploy ee \ < ' 1 lei 1 tl le 
employment agistment is at will. Hodgson, S44 P .2d 331, 335 (Utah 1992); BTehany \ . 
Nordstrom, Inc., 812 P.2d 49, 55 (Utah 1991). 
1 he Ei i lploy i i lei it A gi eei i lent pi o v ided tl lat ' "\ ppe llai it > v ould be ai I at w ill 
employee of GCE for a period of one year, and that the relationship could continue at 
GCE's request and :hc inuiu.n o n nui. ; of those parties 1- a:so {provided, howevei \w 
Appellant's empu;\mcn; . - .-: uu icimmaied ai aa . ;;. - r> uilier party. (K^ . ,r< ,. \ 
42< \ ) 1 hus, \ppell; int's c stilled expectatioi i i v i i •> t l \t /!: I n i w a s ai :i i it \ v ill i 
w li,- ...oiild be terminated ai an\ time.., bi it who was guaranteed a premium price for his 
stock i : - company, as determine iu
 ti .,,:-.. party accountant, upon termination of his 
. : . • , .1 
compensation above and beyond what he was entitled to under the Employment 
Agreement and the Buy-Sell Agreement. (Rec. at 417.) 
t Vppell:: n it I ecei v e d e> ;e i y 1:1 in ig tc • vi lie 1 11 le , /as ei ititled in idei tl le Employment 
Agreement or at common law, and then some. He has produced no evidence that his 
relationship w ith GCE was anything other than at-will employment The implied 
c* . - •-• * iil:S<( • •-- .ppLi,..ni.- ngnts as an at-will 
employee. Sanderson, 844 P.2d at 308. Consequent \rnellant has no e\ i..." 
suppon i. i ; 'ead; of the implied coxenani of iiood iaiin aiu: Lai dealing in conneami; win 
me iLiimnatK.; .,: Uu, employment, an*, a,,, inai court's grant of summary judgment 
liniiiiillil he affn iiinl. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED APPELLEES' MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON APPELLANT'S CLAIM FOR BREACH 
OF THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING 
IN CONNECTION WITH THE CALCULATION OF GCE'S NET BOOK 
VALUE. 
The Buy-Sell Agreement provided that upon termination of Appellant's 
employment, whether voluntarily or involuntarily, GCE would repurchase his stock. The 
amount to be repaid to Appellant was also set forth in the agreement and escalated during 
the term of his employment at GCE to a maximum of 140%. The net book value of GCE 
was to be determined conclusively by the company's accountant, Nyle Willis. (Rec. at 
292.) 
Appellant's only claim is that GCE breached the implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing when it applied Willis' calculation of net book value to determine the 
amount to pay Appellant as his buyout. Appellant rehearses a litany of perceived 
accounting flaws that he claims led to the "purposeful" undervaluation of GCE. 
Appellant's claims fail for several independent reasons. First, Appellant waived in 
the Separation Agreement any claim he had to miscalculation of his buyout. Second, 
Appellant is estopped as an officer and director from complaining about historical 
accounting practices that he ratified in that capacity. Moreover, as the beneficiary of an 
escalator clause giving him 140% of his net book value in GCE at his buyout and as the 
prior recipient of several years of aggressive amortization that sheltered substantial 
income for him, Appellant should not now be heard to complain that the accounting 
records of GCE should have been completely unwound and recalculated to provide him 
with yet additional benefits from less aggressive amortization. In short, Appellant failed 
to raise any issue of fact that any Appellee acted in bad faith or in such a manner as to 
deprive him of his "justified expectations" in the calculation of his buyout. 
1. Appellant Relinquished any Ciann m nau w.t i n n 
of His Buyout. 
Alter hearing two motions for summary judgment, Judge Mclff concluded 
11i.il \ppellant , mihl not prevail on his claim for bieacr. of the implied covenant <»f r -d 
*..ii.. ,-.i \.. \" in com * J ILM:- .^-. 
Appt Iters' second n lotioi i, Judge Mclff concluded that Appellant had essentially 
acquiesced u- .in*: benefited fiom GCE's accounting practices prior to the time of his 
separation in r ^( . . -m ,. • . . i :.LC possibility * ; ;. **i.... :or accounting discrepancies 
i l l i i i i t i * - *• ' • ' • « * ' • ' i 
for summary judgment, Judge Mclff concluded thai tlit undisputed fact- showed that all 
accounting issues, save those relating to the Arizona Tax Refund, were acquiesced to by 
Arizona Tax Refund, arising from the Buy-Sell Agreement. (Rec. at 2050-2052.) 
8
 In his brief on this appeal, Appellant argues that he was not required to raise a 
genuine issue of material fact that Appellees acted unreasonably or in bad faith; rather, he 
asserts he need only raise a fact issue that Appellees failed to act reasonably or in good faith. 
This appears to be a distinction without a difference. Appellant certainly offers no authority 
for the alleged "gray area" between reasonableness and unreasonableness, between good faith 
and bad faith. Moreover, Utah case law clearly requires intent to breach the implied covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing. St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 
199 (Utah 1991). 
9
 As discussed below, Ji idge Mclff allowed Appellant to proceed only on 1;N chin ;hat 
GCE breached the implied covenant by improperly accounting for the contingency of a 
possible refund of taxes paid to the State of Arizona. The ruling on the tax refund portn 
Appellant's claim is the subject of Appellees' cross-appeal, See Section VIII A., infra. 
As the trial court properly concluded, it cannot be disputed that Appellant 
knowingly accepted the purchase price for the stock and other consideration upon signing 
the Separation Agreement. Appellant, therefore, reached an accord and satisfaction or 
has waived any claim he had under the Buy-Sell Agreement. The Buy-Sell Agreement 
provided that Appellant's buyout was to be calculated by Willis, GCE's independent 
accountant, and that Willis' determination was to be conclusive. (Rec. at 292, 1737.92, 
1737.120.) Willis did, indeed, calculate Appellant's buyout. In advance of doing so, 
however, Appellant was given an estimate of his buyout by Don Saunders. (Rec. at 300.) 
Several days later, on July 25, 1992, Appellant signed the Separation Agreement which 
recited the consideration that was to be given to Appellant in connection with his 
resignation and the buyout of his GCE stock. The amount of consideration Appellant 
was to be given in exchange for his stock was less than the amount earlier estimated by 
Saunders. (Rec. at 299-300.) Appellant acknowledged the accuracy of this amount and 
agreed to it by executing the Separation Agreement. It is undisputed that he thereafter 
accepted GCE's promissory note in that amount together with periodic payments over a 
period of six years, several payments of which were tendered and accepted after the 
lawsuit was filed. (Rec. at 296-297, 832-833, 2051-2052, 2056.) These acts alone 
constitute an accord and satisfaction or waiver of any claim Appellant might have had 
that the buyout was miscalculated. 
Moreover, Appellant also was given a severance payment and GCE waived the 
non-competition provisions of the Employment Agreement. These benefits were in 
addition to any amounts to which Appellant might have claimed he was entitled. As a 
i esi lit of tl lis additioi lal consideration, Appellant agreed that the amounts received b> 1 iini 
i 
This provision constitutes further evidence of Appellant's waiver of any claim for 
miscalculation of his buyout. Appellant acknowledged that he negotiated the check for 
additioi ia.1 coi isiderati : it i ( I ^ ec at 29 / ) . " • . 
Having signed the Separation Agreement while recognizing that the hi ^ *\ as 
less than he expected to receive. ha\ ing accepted the payment of :he hu\out o\er a period 
oi six years even a:K; •,. ;.,v.. .... ... \ .1;. .tp„ aiiei rui\ mg received the benefit of 
fi n tl lei considei ati : I i ii I liei i c 1 ai iy otl lei clain 11 le 1 1 ligl it 1 la < e foi additioi lal i i i :)i icy, 
Appellant clearly is precluded from asserting that 1 ic now is entitled to more mone> 
because \\ illi- m^calculateu m> im\*M.. I ]W2 h^ed upon information then availr^V. 
waiver as outlined above. See supra, Section VILA. 
2. Appellant is Estopped from Attacking GCE's Accounting Practices. 
;-MY| •• ){ i M ) ; - ; - • • — A : ; iA *..r .Jed covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing also fails because Appellant was aware of the accuuiu -
treatment and, in fact, benefited from the accounting practices of GCE from 1086 to his 
i esigi latioi i ii i In il\ 1992, "l c coi dii lgly, i Appellant is estopped from clan ning tl lat the 
accounting treatment was ii npi opei See, e.g., Claire \ Km- e*e Pans . _ / ' . > ! . 1 
272, 274 (Ga. 10"*) t noiine a firmly established rule that shareholder is estopped from 
compla;nmg w; .^ > i.; ^Jm.. - participates or acquiesces, o r ^ i n u . ne ratifies); Fincher 
v. CaiiLouiiie ivuianc i i, , J 4 ^ So M |M| I Ii I il ,i I \pp I"' pi until) estopped 
from complaining of coiporate mismanagement where he participated in management of 
corporation as officer, director and employee); Wolf v. Globe Liquor Co., 103 A.2d 774, 
111 (Del. 1954) (plaintiffs participation in corporate decisions estops him from 
complaining of them). 
Appellant's own expert's testimony completely undermines his claim of bad faith. 
This expert opined on several occasions that not only did the company's accountant 
violate GAAP, but that the officers and directors were complicit in this breach. (Rec. at 
1510-1522.) Since there is no dispute that Appellant at all relevant times was both an 
officer and director of GCE, his own expert's testimony defeats his claim of bad faith. 
His expert admits that the officers and directors either knew of these accounting practices 
or should have known of these accounting practices. (Rec. at 1515-1520.) In fact, the 
facts demonstrate that Appellant was aware of GCE's accounting practices. (Rec. at 
1310-1311.) Accordingly, this is a clear case where Appellant's own knowledge of or 
access to relevant knowledge estops him from asserting his claim of bad faith. 
Appellant was also the beneficiary of the accounting entries about which he now 
complains. For example, amortization of the covenant not-to-compete over a four-year 
term rather than recharacterizing it as payment for the river running permit and 
amortizing it over a substantially longer term sheltered Appellants proportionate share of 
$250,000 in annual income.1 (Rec. at 1871.) The same is true of the other accounting 
entries about which Appellant complains. In short, Appellant should not now be 
permitted to base a breach of implied covenant claim on accounting entries in which he 
acquiesced and from which he clearly benefited. For the reasons discussed below, his 
active or passive participation in these entries, and his active benefit from these entries 
completely undermine any claim that he was deprived of his justifiable expectations upon 
calculation of his buyout. 
3- Mr. Rasmussen's Testimony Regarding GCE's Valuation of Assets is 
Inadmissible. 
Appellant relied entirely on the testimony of Derk Rasmussen to support 
his assertion that Mr. Willis violated GAAP and the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing that GCE breached. As discussed below, Mr. Rasmussen's opinions about 
violation of GAAP by the company's accountant are inadmissible and should not have 
been considered by the trial court on summary judgment. See Section VIII.B., infra. 
Appellant's claim clearly fails as a matter of law without the benefit of those opinions. 
10
 As discussed below, Appellant's argument about recharacterization of this particular 
payment is unavailing. The result is the same whether $1 million is attributed as payment for a 
covenant not-to-compete or for a river running permit. See Section VIII.B.2.b., infra. In 
either event, amortization over the four-year term would clearly have been allowed by GAAP 
even though Appellant's expert would have amortized it over a longer term. 
4. Even With Mr. Rasmussen's Testimony, Appellant's Evidence of 
Accounting Irregularities Does Not Defeat Appellees' Motion for 
Summary Judgment 
Even with Rasmussen's inadmissible testimony, Appellant lacks any 
evidence of intent or bad faith by Appellees. In the absence of such evidence, there was 
simply no factual basis for Appellant's claim and, therefore, the trial court properly 
dismissed Appellant's claim based upon the net book value calculation. 
Under the implied covenant, the parties to a contract impliedly agree that they will 
not intentionally or purposely do anything that will injure or destroy the other party's 
right to receive the benefits of the contract. St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's 
Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 199 (Utah 1991); Andalex Resources, Inc. v. Myers. 871 P.2d 1041, 
1047 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). To comply with the obligation to perform a contract in good 
faith, the party's actions must be consistent with the agreed common purpose and 
justified expectations of the other party. Id. Depriving a party of its contractual rights for 
a legitimate or good faith reason does not violate the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing. Brown v. Weis, 871 P.2d 552, 564 n.18 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). Rather, to show 
that a party to a contract breached the implied covenant by exercising its discretion under 
the contract, that discretion must be exercised unreasonably and in bad faith. Cook v. 
Zion's First Nat'l Bank, 919 P.2d 56, 60 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 925 P.2d 963 
(1996). 
Appellant's argument appears to be that he has stated a claim for breach of the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing because his accountant disagrees with GCE's 
accounting practices, largely because GCE's accountant did not amortize certain assets 
for the longest periods allowed by GAAP even though GAAP did allow the amortization 
periods Willis did apply.11 In support of this theory, Appellant relies upon case law 
where one party to a contract having discretion has exercised that discretion in bad faith, 
thereby depriving the injured party of the benefit of his or her reasonably expected 
bargain. Appellant's reliance on this case authority is unpersuasive for several reasons. 
First, the cases relied upon by Appellant are inapposite. In each of these cases, the 
breach was predicated on the acts or omissions of one party to the contract. See, e.g., 
Olympus Hills, 889 P.2d at 451. In this case, in contrast, the calculation of Appellant's 
buyout was entrusted to the accountant servicing the corporation rather than to GCE 
itself. Appellant has identified no legal authority for the proposition that one party to the 
contract breaches the covenant of good faith and fair dealing where an independent, third 
party reaches a decision allegedly contrary to the other party's interest in the contract. In 
the absence of evidence that GCE improperly influenced the decision of this third party, 
there is no tenable basis upon which to assert breach of the constructive covenant of good 
1 9 
faith and fair dealing. 
11
 Appellant's brief focuses on the minutia of many of these accounting entries. 
Appellant's expert, unfortunately, simply did not understand many of the entries and based 
most of his testimony on the fact that GAAP might have allowed a longer amortization period 
than Willis actually applied. Appellees fully briefed the trial court below as to the numerous 
errors made by Appellant's so-called accounting expert, explaining why these accounting 
entries were entirely appropriate under GAAP. (See Rec. at 1171-1180.) Since the trial 
court's memorandum decision did not focus on the peculiarities of each of these accounting 
entries but, rather, took a more global approach, so too does this brief. 
12
 Willis has testified unequivocally that none of the Appellees attempted to 
influence or manipulate his calculation of the Appellant's buyout. At his deposition, Willis 
(continued...) 
Second, the mere fact of disagreement between accountants about the application 
of GAAP is simply not enough to establish bad faith. The implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing protects against acts or omissions that intentionally or purposely destroy 
or injure a party's right to receive the fruits of the contract. Andalex, 871 P.2d at 1047. 
The mere fact of disagreement between Rasmussen and Willis about accounting entries 
does not show an intent or purpose to deprive Appellant of the benefit of his bargain 
contrary to his justified expectations. Instead, it demonstrates a professional 
disagreement that does not rise to the level of bad faith. Stated differently, even if Willis 
had deviated from GAAP, that alone would not show violation of the implied covenant 
without some evidence such deviation defeated the agreed common purpose of the deal 
as well as the justified expectations of the parties.13 
All Appellant and his "expert" have succeeded in demonstrating is GCE's 
corporate philosophy of shorter rather than longer amortization to achieve maximum tax 
benefits allowed under law (which also were permissable under GAAP). This strategy 
not only was approved by Appellant himself, as an insider and officer, it also inured to 
(...continued) 
was asked to describe the process by which he calculated the Appellant's buyout. Willis 
testified that after being notified the Appellant was leaving GCE, he went to the books and 
records of GCE to calculate Appellant's buyout and made those changes necessary to comply 
with GAAP. (Rec. at 1341-1352.) Willis further testified that he made certain adjustments to 
the financial statements of GCE to comply with GAAP in calculating Appellant's buyout. Id. 
His affidavit confirms as much. (Rec. at 1263-1264.) 
13
 Even then, of course, Willis' conduct would not have breached the implied covenant 
since he was not a party to the Buy-Sell Agreement. 
his benefit. It is completely disingenuous for Appellant now to claim that this philosophy 
deprived him of his justified expectations at the time his buyout was calculated, and that 
it was agreed by the parties to the contract that Appellant should take extra consideration 
on both ends (i.e., at the inception of the business by early amortization and at the back 
end by applying the escalator clause (140% of net book value) while ignoring such 
amortization). Since no fact or inference has been shown to support a claim that 
decisions made years before his termination were made with the intention or for the 
purpose of depriving Appellant of the benefit of his bargain, his claim failed as a matter 
of law and was properly dismissed by the trial court. 
C. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED APPELLANT'S CLAIM 
FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES ON HIS ONLY REMAINING CLAIM FOR 
BREACH OF THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR 
DEALING. 
Appellant concedes in his brief that breach of the implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing is a cause of action sounding in contract, and that punitive damages for 
breach of contract are inappropriate under Utah law. See Brief of Applt. at 39-40 and 
cases cited therein. Appellant attempts to resurrect his claim for punitive damages by 
asserting that such damages may be awarded for an independent tort. Appellant does not 
point out, however, that in eight years of litigating this case and in at least two 
amendments of the Complaint, he has failed to state a single cause of action in tort. Even 
in his brief on appeal, Appellant makes only vague assertions of misconduct and does not 
specifically state the cause of action he alleges much less the elements of such a claim. 
The trial court properly concluded that punitive damages were not appropriate in this 
case, and its decision should be upheld.14 
D. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY APPLIED UTAH PRECEDENT IN 
DENYING APPELLANT'S CLAIM FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES. 
Appellant persists in his puzzling battle against the rule, well established in 
American jurisprudence, that attorneys' fees are generally not recoverable unless 
provided for by statute or contract. Appellant argues for an "extension" of Utah law that 
would actually be an almost wholesale rejection of the well-settled rule, relying on 
Canyon Country Store v. Bracey, 781 P.2d 414 (Utah 1989) and Heslop v. Bank of Utah, 
839 P.2d 828 (Utah 1992). 
Heslop is simply inapposite to Appellant's remaining claim for breach of implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing with respect to the Buy-Sell Agreement. Nor 
does Heslop's reasoning apply to Appellant's dismissed claims arising from the 
Employment Agreement or his employment relationship with GCE generally. 
Appellant was a part owner in a business where he had obtained GCE's promise to 
buy his stock in the company at a premium if his employment was terminated. Indeed, 
Appellant received a substantial cash payment for his stock. Moreover, Appellant was 
able to negotiate even greater consideration than provided under the Buy-Sell Agreement. 
14
 In the event of remand, it should be made clear that Appellant may not attempt to 
introduce facts allegedly supporting a claim for punitive damages in this contract case in the 
hopes of stumbling upon some tort theory that has not been pleaded. To the extent the trial 
court's analysis of the attorneys' fees issue can be read to suggest that Appellant may be 
allowed to introduce such evidence, it is clear that the introduction of such evidence would be 
highly prejudicial to Appellees. 
Consequently, Heslop's considerations regarding the vulnerable position of discharged 
employees do not apply in this case. In this context, the rationale of Bracey and Heslop 
clearly do not apply to allow Appellant to recover attorneys' fees. 
Finally, the trial court's decision to deny Appellant his claimed attorneys' fees is 
reviewed for abuse of discretion. Baldwin v. Burton, 850 P.2d 1188, 1199 (Utah 1993). 
The trial court obviously considered the Bracey and Heslop decisions in its order denying 
attorneys' fees. (Rec. at 2048-2049.) Under the relevant law, Appellant simply cannot 
show that the trial court, which clearly considered the facts and law, abused its discretion 
in denying his award of attorneys' fees where there was no statutory or contractual 
support therefore. Consequently, the trial court's decision on this claim should be 
upheld. 
E. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT AMENDMENT 
OF APPELLANT'S COMPLAINT TO ADD A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR 
UNJUST ENRICHMENT WAS FUTILE. 
After two amendments of his Complaint and two motions for summary judgment, 
Appellant moved the court for leave to amend his Complaint a third time to add a cause 
of action for unjust enrichment. This motion, which was objectionable on several 
grounds, was denied by the trial court. Appellant's motion was properly denied, among 
other reasons, because he could not possibly state a cause of action for unjust enrichment 
based upon GCE's accounting for and receipt of the Arizona Tax Refund. As a result, 
that cause of action would have been subject to immediate dismissal and the motion was, 
therefore, futile. Andalex, 871 P.2d. at 1046 (leave to amend complaint should be denied 
when party seeks to assert a new claim that is insufficient or futile). 
To state a claim for unjust enrichment, Appellant must show: 1) a benefit 
conferred on one person by another; 2) an appreciation or knowledge by the conferee of 
the benefit; and 3) the acceptance or retention by the conferee of the benefit under 
circumstances as to make it inequitable for the conferee to retain the benefit without 
payment of its value. American Towers Owners Ass'n v. CCI Mech., Inc., 930 P.2d 
1182, 1192 (Utah 1996). The remedy of unjust enrichment presupposes that the benefit is 
conferred by the party seeking the remedy and received by the party from whom relief is 
sought. For example, in the American Towers case, this Court noted that the plaintiff 
"did not confer any benefit upon any of the appellants and therefore cannot claim that any 
of the appellants have been unjustly enriched. Any enrichment received by appellants 
was not to the detriment of the [plaintiff] because [the plaintiff] did not pay any of the 
consideration which appellants received under the contracts." Id. at 1193. On that basis, 
the American Towers court granted summary judgment dismissing the unjust enrichment 
claim, which was affirmed by the Utah Supreme Court. Id. 
In this case, Appellant's claim rests solely upon the receipt by Appellees of the so-
called Arizona Tax Refund. It cannot be disputed that this refund was not paid by 
Appellant to GCE; rather, it was a refund paid to GCE by the State of Arizona from taxes 
paid by GCE's customers, not Appellant. Because Appellant cannot show that he 
conferred any benefit upon Appellees in connection with the Arizona Tax Refund, he 
could not succeed on an unjust enrichment claim, and the trial court properly denied his 
insufficient and futile motion to dismiss.1 
VIII. ARGUMENT ON CROSS APPEAL 
A. THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY DENIED GCE'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON APPELLANT'S CLAIM FOR BREACH OF 
THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING 
ARISING OUT OF THE ARIZONA TAX REFUND. 
In denying GCE's motion for summary judgment on Appellant's implied covenant 
claim as it related to the Arizona Tax Refund, the trial court melded the disparate legal 
theories of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and unjust enrichment to 
create a new equitable remedy heretofore unrecognized under Utah law. (Rec. at 
1737.107-1737.114, 1868-1870.) There is simply no legal support for this novel remedy. 
1. The Undisputed Facts. 
The facts regarding the Arizona Tax Refund are set forth in detail in the 
record below, and are outlined in less detail above. (Facts, supra, ^] 36-57.)16 Briefly, 
the Admissions Tax was charged by GCE to its customers and then paid by GCE to the 
state of Arizona. A request to refund the Admissions Tax was filed in 1990 as a 
bargaining chip in conjunction with another tax dispute. GCE was informed from the 
outset by its tax counsel, Ann Dumenil, that it was unlikely to prevail on the Admissions 
15
 Appellant's proposed claim for unjust enrichment would also fail since unjust 
enrichment is not available as a remedy arising from a written contract like the Buy-Sell 
Agreement. American Towers, 930 P.2d at 1192. 
16
 Citations to the record on appeal on this issue are contained in the Statement of Facts. 
Tax issue because of existing legal precedent. Even if it did prevail, Dumenil opined that 
GCE probably would be obligated to repay the taxes to its customers rather than retain 
them. Denoyer therefore instructed Dumenil in 1991 to dismiss the protest once the other 
tax issue was resolved. Dumenil did not do so, however, and neglected to inform GCE 
she had not dismissed the protest. 
Significantly, GCE's accountant, Nyle Willis, knew of this refund request long 
before Appellant's departure. (Rec. at 1807-1809, 1868.) He did not book the refund 
request as an asset because it was a remote contingency that, if it ever matured, likely 
1 "7 
would result only in expenses to the corporation to refund the refund to its customers. 
Willis calculated Appellant's share of book value assuming that the protest was 
still extant but, nevertheless, not an asset for the reasons discussed above. Appellant 
signed the Separation Agreement on July 25, 1992 and therby accepted this calculation of 
book value. 
Shortly after the Separation Agreement was signed, Denoyer was informed that the 
1 O 
refund request still had not been dismissed. He again instructed Dumenil to dismiss it. 
Several years later, the Arizona Court of Appeals essentially reversed itself and found 
17
 Although Willis was unaware that Denoyer had asked Dumenil to dismiss the 
refund request, it simply did not matter to him because it had not been booked as an asset 
anyway. (Rec. at 1807-1808, 1868.) 
18
 Documents were discovered following the last ruling on summary judgment 
demonstrating that the refund request at issue apperently was dismissed. Accordingly, if Judge 
Mclff is not overruled, this matter may be ripe again for summary judgment based on this new 
evidence. 
that the Admissions Tax was impermissible under Arizona's tax statutes. The Arizona 
Supreme Court affirmed. ADOR permitted river running companies such as GCE to 
keep a portion of such tax refunds while requiring them to refund another portion to their 
customers. 
2. The Trial Courtfs Decisions 
Appellant first raised the Arizona Tax Refund in an oblique manner at the 
hearing on the first motion for summary judgment. The matter was then addressed more 
directly in the second motion for summary judgment. (Rec. at 831-832.) Judge Mclffs 
second memorandum decision denied summary judgment on this issue even though the 
trial court found that Appellant could not state a claim for unjust enrichment since GCE's 
customers, rather than Appellant, had bestowed this benefit upon the corporation. (Rec. 
at 1751-1752.) Nevertheless, Judge Mclff ruled that it was for a jury to decide whether 
the Appellant had a reasonable expectation of participating in this refund based on the 
implied covenant even though the contract between the parties had been terminated years 
before the refund was granted. (Rec. at 1750-1751.) The opinion also makes reference to 
imputing Dumenil's knowledge to GCE's president and speaks, in unfortunately vague 
terms, about "sharp practices" without further elaboration. (Rec. at 1748-1750.) 
The issue was revisited on the third motion for summary judgment. The trial court 
stood by its earlier ruling despite undisputed testimony that the refund claim was not a 
bookable GAAP asset at the time of Appellant's separation from employment in 1992. 
The trial court declined to apply the same accord and satisfaction or waiver principles to 
this issue as it did with respect to all other accounting issues. (Rec. at 2050-2051.) 
While the lower court's analysis is not entirely clear as to when the purported breach of 
the implied covenant possibly occurred (i.e., in 1992 when the buyout was calculated or 
years later when the refund was made and GCE did not share it with Appellant), it 
appears that Judge Mclff s result-oriented ruling is predicated on what happened in the 
years following termination of the Buy-Sell Agreement rather than at or about the time of 
such termination in 1992. In essence, the decision is predicated on the lower court's 
sense that it was unfair of Appellees not to share the refund with Appellant. (Id.) 
3- Utah Law 
Breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing gives rise to a 
legal remedy for breach of contract. St. Benedict's, 811 P.2d at 199. Unjust enrichment, 
on the other hand, is a purely equitable remedy that is to be applied only where there is 
no express contract. E.g., American Towers, 930 P.2d at 1192. Borrowing principles 
from an equitable remedy like unjust enrichment to apply to a legal cause of action sets a 
very dangerous precedent. The same rationale, for example, could be used to unwind a 
bad bargain on the grounds that it was inequitable or unjust. The implied covenant 
plainly is not intended as a vehicle to incorporate bits and pieces of unjust enrichment 
law into the law of contracts. 
It is also important to understand what the constructive covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing means under Utah law. Utah courts repeatedly have stated that the covenant 
is a constructive promise that neither party will intentionally or purposely do anything 
that will destroy or injure the other party's right to receive the fruits of the contract. E.g., 
Andalex, 871 P.2d at 1047 (citation omitted). This standard does not mean that the 
covenant is breached by an act or omission that is unintentional or not purposeful (i.e., a 
mutual mistake). Similarly, the implied covenant does not create an equitable claim 
based on vague and ambiguous principles of fairness. 
Utah courts have also stated that a party's actions must be consistent with the 
agreed common purpose and justified expectations of the other party. Id. (emphasis 
added). This does not mean that hindsight can be used to bootstrap a breach of implied 
covenant claim. It also does not mean that the covenant can be construed to establish 
new, independent rights or duties that have not been agreed upon by the parties. Id. If 
the Buy-Sell Agreement requires application of GAAP, then GAAP should define what 
assets are included in the calculation of Appellant's buyout at the time the buyout is 
required to be calculated. To expand that concept to include general principles of equity 
and fairness to Appellant's buyout impermissibly expands the scope of the contract 
without legal justification. 
Finally, and significantly, Utah law does not provide that the implied covenant 
survives termination of the contract which gave it life in the first place. Neither 
Appellant nor the trial court below has cited any authority from Utah or any other 
jurisdiction holding that an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing survives 
termination of the underlying contract. In fact, the legal authorities are precisely to the 
contrary. See Republic Group, Inc. v. Won-Door, Corp., 883 P.2d 285, 289-90 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1994) (implied covenant ends when underlying contract terminates). The law of 
this jurisdiction certainly should not be extended to create amorphous rights that exist in 
perpetuity and, therefore, deprive contracting parties of any certainty or finality when 
their relationship is terminated. 
4. The Trial Court's Analysis is Fundamentally Flawed for Several 
Reasons. 
Summary judgment should have been granted to GCE on the Arizona Tax 
Refund issue for several independent reasons. First, there is no rational basis to 
distinguish the Arizona Tax Refund from the other accounting issues about which the 
court found accord and satisfaction, waiver, estoppel and/or ratification. Second, the 
lower court's reliance, in whole or in part, upon imputation of knowledge from outside 
tax counsel to the corporation to create a claim where none otherwise existed is 
unavailing. Further, there is absolutely no evidence from which a rational jury could 
conclude that Appellant had a reasonable or justified expectation to share in the refund 
when it was not a bookable asset at the time his buyout was calculated, any more so that 
GCE had a reasonable or justified expectation that Appellant would share in any 
liabilities arising after the termination of his employment related temporally to his period 
of employment. Finally, as a matter of law, the covenant did not survive termination of 
the Buy-Sell Agreement and, therefore, is not available to support a claim based on 
conduct occurring years later. 
a. Accord and Satisfaction and/or Waiver 
In its second and third memorandum decisions, the trial court essentially 
held that Appellant had reached an accord and satisfaction, waiver or estoppel as to his 
accounting claims with the sole exception of the Arizona Tax Refund. (Rec. at 1747-
1755, 2047-2058.) The trial court's basis for distinguishing this accounting issue from 
the plethora of other accounting issues raised by Appellant below is unpersuasive. 
The trial court mistakenly concluded that a distinction existed because the issue 
was "not discussed nor contemplated when the settlement documents were prepared and 
executed and is entirely beyond the fixing of values by the accountant.1' (Rec. at 2050-
2051.) Judge Mclff is simply wrong. This is not a case of an undisclosed or overlooked 
"asset". Although there was confusion about whether the appeal had been dismissed, that 
confusion is irrelevant because the refund claim was not an asset regardless of its status 
or the parties' knowledge of its status. In fact, the person charged with calculating the 
buyout: 1) knew about the refund claim; 2) did not consider it an asset; and 3) did not 
know the corporation had requested withdrawal of the tax protest. (Rec. at 1807-1808.) 
Thus, any "discussion" of the refund would have been meaningless and there clearly was 
no "oversight" by the accountant as suggested in the third memorandum decision. 
Furthermore, the trial court's reference to the issue being "beyond the fixing of 
values" strongly supports Appellees' theory that Judge Mclff decided to rewrite the 
parties' contract to decide this issue as a matter of equity. The calculation of Appellant's 
buyout was to be made based upon "fixable values" not according to undefined equitable 
principles. The refund, as a remote contingency, was "beyond the fixing of values" only 
because it had no value at the time of Appellant's buyout. There is no sound basis, 
therefore, upon which to distinguish this particular accounting matter from the other 
accounting entries at issue. 
b. Imputation of the Tax Attornev!s Knowledge is a Red Herring. 
In its second memorandum decision, the trial court suggested that the tax 
attorney's knowledge that the refund request had not been dismissed was imputed to the 
corporation. In response, Appellees' third motion for summary judgment addressed 
precisely why the trial court's theory of imputation was irrelevant. This analysis is 
explained in detail in the record below and will not be repeated in full here. (Rec. at 
1855-1861.) 
Briefly, if the tax attorney's knowledge was imputed to corporate officials, then it 
was imputed to all corporate officials, including Appellant. Therefore, the parties were 
operating on equal footing, and Appellant cannot argue any mistake or impropriety. On 
the other hand, if the knowledge of the attorney was not imputed to GCE, then no one 
was aware that the appeal had not been withdrawn. A claim of mutual mistake is simply 
insufficient as a matter of law to establish breach of the implied covenant. Finally, even 
if such knowledge was imputed to Appellees but not Appellant (a unilateral mistake 
theory), no claim will lie because knowledge of this remote contingent claim that (a) was 
unlikely to succeed, (b) was unlikely to yield a refund that the corporation could even 
retain if successful, and (c) that the corporation wanted dismissed, would have not 
resulted in any different calculation of Appellant's buyout based on Mr. Willis' 
undisputed testimony. 
In the third memorandum decision, the trial court attempted to address this issue in 
a footnote. (Rec. at 2055, fn. 2.) The trial court's reasoning is unpersuasive. If the other 
officers and directors had constructive knowledge that the tax appeal had not been 
dismissed a year before Appellant's termination, then Appellant was invested with that 
knowledge as well. Once possessing this "imputed knowledge," Appellant was not 
suddenly divested of such knowledge when his relationship with Appellees became 
"adversarial" in July 1992. In short, Appellant is not imputed to have such knowledge 
and then to constructively have forgotten it. Neither Appellant nor the trial court cited 
any authority for this unusual proposition. 
c. Appellant Has No Reasonable or Justified Expectation to Share 
in the Refund Claim. 
The Buy-Sell Agreement provided that Appellant's buyout was to be 
calculated as of the date of his separation of employment. It also provided that net book 
value upon which his buyout was to be calculated was based upon GAAP as determined 
conclusively by GCE's accountant. (Rec. at 292.) Thus, what was or was not an asset 
was to be determined according to GAAP as of July 1992 not based upon an asset 
springing to life years later. 
It is also undisputed that GCE's accountant was aware of the refund claim well in 
advance of Appellant's temiination. (Rec. at 1808-1809, 1868.) However, he determined 
that it was not a bookable asset under GAAP since it was a remote contingency that, if it 
ever matured, most likely would result in a refund that GCE would be obligated to then 
refund to the customers who had paid the tax. (Rec. at 1808.) Appellant's expert offered 
no opinion to the contrary. 
The memorandum decisions addressing the Arizona Tax Refund do not clearly 
delineate when the jury may be permitted to find a breach of the implied covenant 
occurred. The only two conceivable times would be July 1992, when the buyout was 
calculated, or several years later when the refund was made. In either event, Appellant 
could have had no reasonable or justified expectation of sharing in the refund and no 
reasonable jury could conclude otherwise.19 
i. July 1992 
It is inconceivable that any rational jury could find that Appellant had a 
reasonable or justified expectation in July 1992 that this remote, contingent tax refund 
claim should have been included as an asset even though it was unbookable under 
GAAP. This is not a case where an asset was hidden or mistakenly overlooked. GCE's 
accountant knew of the refund claim and concluded that it was not a bookable asset. 
Appellant's own expert has not offered a contrary opinion. 
Even if Dumenil's knowledge that the protest had not been dismissed is imputed 
solely to Denoyer, rather than to all officers and directors, the result does not change. All 
Denoyer would have known in 1992 was that a refund claim that he wanted dismissed 
had not been dismissed. This knowledge would not have changed Dumenil's underlying 
advice that GCE was unlikely to succeed on the claim or to be able to keep the money if 
it did succeed, or Willis' opinion that the claim had no value. There is simply no basis to 
conclude that any of the Appellees acted intentionally or purposely to deprive Appellant 
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 Because the facts can reasonably lead only to the conclusion that Appellant had no 
reasonable expectation of participation in the Arizona Tax Refund, summary judghment on that 
question was proper. English v. Kienke, 774 P.2d 1154, 1157 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), affd, 
848 P.2d 153 (1993). 
of some reasonable or justified expectation to share in this tax refund in July 1992 when 
it was not included as an asset in Appellants buyout. 
The trial couifs opinion also impermissibly rewrites the underlying contract. The 
Buy-Sell Agreement provides that Appellant's buyout was to be calculated according to 
GAAP. (Rec. at 292.) Since the undisputed evidence is that the refund claim in July 
1992 was not a GAAP asset, the inquiry should end there. Although Judge Mclff noted 
this testimony, the lower court stated that it is not "solely determinative of relevancy" 
without articulating what else would be "determinative of relevancy" as of July 1992. 
(Rec. at 2052-2053.) Whatever was meant by this phrase, it suggests that the trial court 
was attempting to rewrite the underlying deal between the parties. It is black letter Utah 
law that an implied covenant does not restructure the fundamental agreement of the 
contracting parties. Brehany, 812 P.2d at 55 (covenant not construed to establish new, 
independent rights or duties not agreed upon by the parties, to nullify rights granted by a 
contract to one of the parties or to require a party to exercise contractual right in a manner 
contrary to its own legitimate self-interest); Brown, 871 P.2d at 564 n. 20 (implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing must not be construed to establish new rights "not 
agreed upon by the parties"). Therefore, the accountant's undisputed testimony is, 
indeed, determinative of this issue. 
ii. 1995 and 1996 
A jury should not be permitted, as a matter of law, to find a breach of the 
implied covenant several years after termination of the Buy-Sell Agreement that gave rise 
to the covenant itself. The question of whether the implied covenant survived 
termination of the Buy-Sell Agreement is a question of law about which Judge Mclff 
made no decision except, perhaps, by implication. Rather than make an express 
determination, and grapple with the exceedingly difficult questions that would arise from 
extending the implied covenant virtually in perpetuity, Judge Mclff simply punted this 
fundamental legal question to the jury. 
The Buy-Sell Agreement terminated in July 1992. Judge Mclff should have ruled 
as a matter of law that the implied covenant did not survive its termination. See 
Republic Group, 883 P.2d at 289-90. The trial court's refusal to rule on this issue is 
directly contrary both to the letter and policy of Utah law. The trial court's result-
oriented opinion based on principles of fairness lends no certainty or finality to 
contractual relationship even years after their termination. 
Nor is Judge Mclff s decision supported by GAAP, which governs the calculation 
of Appellant's buyout. When the refunds were made in 1995 and 1996, GCE's accountant 
took them into income for those periods. He did not note them as prior period 
adjustments because, under black letter GAAP, they did not qualify for that treatment. 
(Rec. at 1806-1807.) Although Appellant's accountant disputed whether the refunds were 
or were not prior period adjustments, his testimony is inadmissible for the reasons 
discussed below. (See Section VIII.B., infra.) More importantly, even if the entries 
should have been noted as prior period adjustments in 1995 and 1996, Appellant's own 
expert agreed that this accounting notation would not have called for recalculation of 
Appellant's buyout or restatement of corporate income for 1992 and prior years. Instead, 
the refund would simply be noted on the financial records of GCE in 1995 and 1996 as 
prior period adjustments and nothing more would have happened. (Rec. at 1183-1186, 
1806.) Thus, even under GAAP, there is no basis for Appellant to share in the refund as 
it was income in 1995 and 1996. 
Neither the trial court nor Appellant has demonstrated any legal basis for allowing 
him to share in the Arizona Tax Refund under a theory of breach of the implied covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing or any other theory. Accordingly, the trial court erred in 
denying GCE's motion for summary judgment on this ground. The trial court's decision 
should be reversed and judgment entered as a matter of law for Appellees. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING THE TESTIMONY OF 
APPELLANT'S EXPERT DERK RASMUSSEN. 
In opposition to Appellees' second motion for summary judgment, Appellant 
submitted an expert affidavit. In this affidavit, Appellant's expert, Derk Rasmussen, 
opined that GCE did not comply with generally accepted accounting principles in its 
treatment of the Arizona Tax Refund and certain assets in the Sobek transaction. A copy 
of Rasmussen's Affidavit is found in the record. (Rec. at 1510-1522.) 
Appellees moved the trial court to exclude Rasmussen's "expert" testimony under 
Utah Rule of Evidence 702 on the grounds that, in rendering his opinions, Rasmussen 
relied upon superseded accounting principles, misapplied the black letter of other 
accounting principles, and relied upon a clearly erroneous factual foundation while 
ignoring other significant and undisputed facts. Additionally, many of Rasmussen's 
opinions were, however misguided, entirely irrelevant to the inquiry before the trial court. 
Despite the unreliable and irrelevant nature of Rasmussen's opinions, however, the trial 
court denied Appellees' motion to exclude Rasmussen's expert testimony without 
analysis or reasoning.20 
It is well-established that reliability and relevance concerns with regard to expert 
testimony are not, as Appellant suggests, matters that are merely left to a jury; rather, 
they go directly to the threshold determination that a trial court must make in exercising 
its critical "gatekeeping" function under Utah Rule of Evidence 702. Accordingly, the 
trial court's failure to exclude Rasmussen's "expert" testimony was error. 
1. Standard of Admissibility of Expert Testimony 
Trial judges are in a unique position to evaluate witnesses, evidence, and 
the trial in its entirety. State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275, 1282 (Utah 1998) (stating that 
trial courts have the obligation to "control and manage the proceedings and preserve the 
integrity of the trial process"). "As to the admission of scientific, technical, or other 
specialized evidence, when counsel has made a proper objection to its admissibility, a 
trial judge is charged with the responsibility of being a 'gatekeeper to carefully scrutinize 
[the] proffered evidence.'" Franklin v. Stevenson, 987 P.2d 22, 26 (Utah 1999) (quoting 
State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 778 (Utah 1991)). "As gatekeeper, it falls to the trial 
court to ensure that [expert testimony] proffered by either party meets the appropriate 
standard of admissibility." Id. 
With regard to Appellees' motion to exclude Rasmussen's expert testimony, the trial 
court's Memorandum Decision merely states: "Each motion has been extensively briefed and 
argued. After careful consideration, the Court has determined to deny [Defendant's motion to 
exclude the testimony of Appellant's expert]." (Rec. at 1755.) 
The general rule for admissibility of expert testimony is Utah Rule of Evidence 
702, which provides: 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of 
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness 
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or 
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. 
(Emphasis added.) It is axiomatic that to "assist the trier of fact," expert testimony must, 
at a minimum, be relevant and reasonably reliable. See, e.g., Turck v. Baker Petrolite 
Corp., 2001 WL 589470, *9 (10th Cir. (Okla.)) ("In order to assist the trier of fact, expert 
testimony must be reasonably reliable." (emphasis added)). Rule 702's "'helpfulness' 
standard also implicates Rule 403 considerations, since if the evidence is confusing or 
unfairly prejudicial it will hinder rather than aid jury decision making." Campbell v. 
State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., _ P.3d _ , 2001 UT 89, 86, cert, denied, 122 S.Ct. 
2326 (2002) (internal quotations omitted); see also Rimmasch, 775 P.2d'at 398 n. 8 
(stating that "any expert evidence, scientifically based or otherwise," must be excluded if 
it would result in "confusion of the issues" or "mislead[] the jury" (emphasis added)). 
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 In State v. Rimmasch, this Court mandated further 702 inquiries where expert 
testimony is based upon novel scientific principles or techniques. 775 P.2d 388, 396 (Utah 
1989). Although this Court has held that "the Rimmasch test was not intended to apply to all 
expert testimony," State v. Adams, 5 P.3d 642, 646 (Utah 2000), it has not held that a trial 
court's "gatekeeping" responsibilities do not extend to all expert testimony. To the contrary, 
this Court explained in Rimmasch that "any expert evidence, scientifically based or 
otherwise," must be excluded as part of the trial court's critical gatekeeping function if it does 
not meet the strictures of Rule 702. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 398 n.8 (emphasis added); see 
also Franklin, 987 P.2d at 26 (stating that a trial court's "gatekeeping" function extends not 
only to the admission of "scientific" evidence, but also to the admission of "technical or other 
specialized evidence" as well). 
Applying these well-established principles to Rasmussen's testimony yields the 
inexorable conclusion that Rasmussen's opinions are inadmissible under Rule 702 and 
should have been excluded by the trial court. 
2. Rasmussen's Opinions Clearly Do Not Meet the Standard for 
Admissibility Under Rule 702. 
a. Rasmussen's Opinions About Treatment of the Arizona Tax 
Refund Are Unreliable and Irrelevant, 
Rasmussen opined that the tax refund received by GCE from the state of 
Arizona, years after Appellant's voluntary resignation, should have been treated as a 
"prior period adjustment" under GAAP. (Rec. at 1510-1511.) Rasmussen's opinion is 
inadmissible, however, for three independent reasons: (1) Rasmussen relied on a 
superseded accounting principle; (2) Rasmussen unquestionably misapplied the proper 
accounting principle; and (3) Rasmussen's opinion is completely irrelevant. 
Rasmussen's first error was relying upon a superseded GAAP principle. Although 
Rasmussen identified no accounting principle indicating that the tax refund must be 
treated as a "prior period adjustment" in his affidavit, he finally stated in his deposition 
that Accounting Principles Board Opinion ("APB") No. 9 is relevant to this issue. (Rec. 
at 1480 (depo. transcript at p. 216).) Rasmussen admitted, however, that APB No. 9 was 
superseded by Statement of Financial Accounting Standards ("FAS") No. 16 nearly 
twenty-five years ago. (Rec. at 1480 (depo. transcript at p. 216, 219).) While GAAP 
may not be "law," it does provide the accounting standards against which the accounting 
practices of GCE are to be measured. Accordingly, Rasmussen's reliance on APB No. 9, 
an accounting principle that has admittedly been outdated for nearly twenty-five years, 
renders his opinion regarding the Arizona Tax Refund fundamentally unreliable, and 
consequently, inadmissible under Rule 702. 
Rasmussen's second error was misapplying the correct GAAP principle, FAS No. 
16, which was promulgated in response to a request for reconsideration of APB No. 9. 
As Rasmussen conceded, FAS No. 16 defines when income realized in a later period 
might be attributed to activities of a prior period. FAS No. 16 states the rule as follows: 
Except as specified in paragraph 11 and in paragraphs 13 and 14 
with respect to prior interim periods of the current year, all items of profit 
and loss recognized during a period, including accruals of estimated losses 
from loss contingencies, shall be included in the determination of net 
income for that period. 
(Rec. at 1457 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).) Accordingly, FAS No. 16 
unequivocally states that an item of profit or loss, such as the Arizona Tax Refund, shall 
not be treated as a prior period adjustment unless the exceptions identified in paragraphs 
11, 13, or 14 are applicable. Rasmussen, however, conceded in his deposition that the 
exceptions set forth in paragraphs 11, 13, and 14 were inapplicable in the instant case. 
(Rec. at 1478 (depo. transcript at p. 233-234).) Therefore, by Rasmussen's own 
admissions, in no event could a trier of fact conclude that GCE's accountant violated 
GAAP by not treating the Arizona Tax Refund as a prior period adjustment. 
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 Appellant argued before the trial court that FAS No. 16 may define some of the 
exceptions where income generated in a later period may be attributed to activities of a prior 
period, but not all of the exceptions. Appellant is mistaken. FAS No. 16 plainly defines the 
universe of exceptions; its exceptions are exhaustive, not merely illustrative. Appellant's 
argument is a classic example of why an expert's testimony must be excluded where the 
principle is improperly applied by the expert. Rasmussen should not be free to redraft this 
GAAP standard in order to further Appellant's interests. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Rasmussen's opinion regarding the 
Arizona Tax Refund is entirely irrelevant. Rasmussen's affidavit offered absolutely no 
evidence that the accounting performed at the time of Appellant's buyout in 1992 would 
have to be revisited by reason of the Arizona Tax Refund received years later. Indeed, 
Rasmussen admitted that GAAP does not require adjustment of prior financial statements 
or recalculation of a shareholder buyout based upon a subsequent economic event: 
Q. But you don't go back and adjust the prior periods' financial 
statements under FASB 16? 
A. No. I have never claimed that you adjust the prior periods' financial 
statements. I'm saying that it — 
* * * 
Q. What do you think Mr. Smith wants to do here, just have it noted 
and do nothing with it? 
A. I think what he wants to have happen — I'm guessing because he 
hasn't told me — is he wants it recognized as that it relates to time 
periods when he was — he had an ownership interest. 
Q. And GAAP doesn't require that, does it? 
A. It doesn't — there is no GAAP that requires you to go back and 
restate the financial statements. 
(Rec. at 1478 (depo. transcript at p. 236-237) (emphasis added).) Accordingly, 
Rasmussen's opinion about whether to treat the Arizona Tax Refund as a prior period 
adjustment, is entirely irrelevant to this inquiry as it cannot permissibly lead to the 
conclusion that Appellant's buyout has to be recalculated based upon such an 
adjustment. 
For the foregoing reasons, Rasmussen's opinion that the Arizona Tax Refund 
should have been treated as a "prior period adjustment" is inadmissible under Rule 702 as 
it cannot "assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in 
issue" and will only result in "confusion of the issues." Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 398 n. 8. 
As such, the trial court's failure to exclude this opinion was plain error. 
b. Rasmussen's Opinions Concerning the Covenant Not to 
Compete and the Concessions Contract Are Irrelevant and 
Unreliable, 
In his affidavit, Rasmussen testified that GCE violated GAAP by allocating 
$1,000,000 of the purchase price of the business owned by Ron Smith prior to 1987 to a 
Covenant Not to Compete (the "Covenant") granted to GCE by Ron Smith. (Rec. at 
1515-1520.) Rasmussen opined that the Covenant was "worthless" and that, 
consequently, the $1,000,000 paid for the Covenant should have been booked to GCE's 
Concession Contract with the National Park Service and amortized for forty years, rather 
than the four years GCE amortized the Covenant.24 (Id.) Like his opinion regarding the 
Appellant argues that Rasmussen's testimony is relevant as to the period of time in 
which the Arizona Tax Refund received by GCE was generated. However, regardless of 
whether Rasmussen's opinion relates to a time period during which Appellant was employed, 
he admits that it is of no consequence because GAAP does not require restatement of financials 
or recalculation of Appellant's buyout. 
24
 Not surprisingly, this maximum amortization period provides the maximum benefit to 
Appellant by adjusting the net book value as of the date of his resignation. 
Arizona Tax Refund, Rasmussen's opinions regarding the Covenant and the Concession 
Contract are irrelevant and unreliable, and therefore, inadmissible. 
i. Rasmussen's Opinions Are Irrelevant. 
Rasmussen's disagreement with GCE about characterization of the $1 
Million payment for the Covenant is another red herring. If the Concession Contract 
could have been amortized over the same period as the Covenant, or over a substantially 
similar period, then there is no evidence of bad faith. Accordingly, any opinion 
Rasmussen might offer about what he personally would have done with the Concession 
Contract is irrelevant. 
Rasmussen agreed that APB No. 17 is the governing authority for amortization of 
intangible assets such as a covenant not to compete or acquisition of a contract right, like 
the Concession Contract at issue. (Rec. at 1490 (depo. transcript at 139).) APB No. 17 
states the rule as follows: 
9. The Board concludes that a company should record as assets the costs of 
intangible assets acquired from others, including good will acquired in the 
business combination. A company should record as expenses the costs to 
develop intangible assets which are not specifically identifiable. The Board 
also concludes that the cost of each type of intangible assets should be 
amortized by systematic charges to income over the period estimated to be 
benefited. The period of amortization should not, however, exceed forty 
years. 
(Rec. at 1463, ^ 9 (emphasis added).) Thus, APB No. 17 establishes a ceiling for 
amortization, not a floor. Indeed, Rasmussen himself acknowledged that the language of 
APB No. 17 vests discretion in the accountant applying the enumerated factors affecting 
amortization (Rec. at 1488 (depo. transcript at p. 153)); that it is possible to amortize the 
Concession Contract over the term of its existence (which is what GCE did with the 
Covenant), (see id. (depo. transcript at p. 155)); and that there is no black letter law that 
says these type of assets must be amortized over forty years. (Rec. at 1484 (depo. 
transcript at p. 187).) 
In light of Rasmussen's concessions, there is no basis upon which the trier of fact 
could conclude from Rasmussen's opinions that amortization over four years rather than 
forty years is bad faith. Since the Concessions Contract could properly, under APB No. 
17, be amortized to the end of the four-year payment stream or to the end of its term in 
1992, whether the $1 Million payment was properly characterized as payment for the 
Covenant, or should have been characterized as payment for the Concessions Contract, 
makes no difference. 
ii. Rasmussen's Opinions Are Based Upon An Erroneous 
Factual Foundation While Ignoring Other Significant and 
Undisputed Facts. 
In addition, Rasmussen's amortization opinion is fundamentally flawed. 
Specifically, Rasmussen's opinion is based upon the erroneous assumption that at the 
inception of GCE's business in 1986, an accountant was required to assume that the 
useful life of a concession contract ran in perpetuity, and therefore, the maximum 
amortization period of forty years applied. (Rec. at 1485 (depo. transcript at p. 178).) In 
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 A breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing does not occur where one 
accountant decides, as Rasmussen has done, that it would be more reasonable to account for an 
asset in a different manner than another accountant. Rather, a breach is shown only where 
there is no basis for a decision. See, e.g., Morton v. Continental Baking Co., 938 P.2d 271, 
274 (Utah 1977). 
making this assumption, however, Rasmussen ignored several critical, undisputed facts, 
such as: (1) the Concession Contract itself provided for a limited term ending on 
December 31, 1992; (2) the contract did not provide a period for renewal; and (3) 
although federal law provided a right of preference to an existing concessionaire, as of 
1986 it provided absolutely no guarantee that an existing concessionaire would be able to 
renew its contract. Accordingly, Rasmussen's "perpetuity assumption" is devoid of 
factual support in the record. 
Rasmussen's perpetuity assumption is not the only factual and analytical flaw in 
his amortization opinion. In GCE's memorandum of points and authorities in support of 
its motion to exclude Rasmussen's expert testimony, GCE outlined at least twenty-one 
additional factual errors that undermine the reliability of Rasmussen's assumptions and 
conclusions. In the interest of space, GCE will not repeat those arguments here, but 
rather incoiporate herein by reference the relevant portions of its memorandum of points 
and authorities in support of its motion to exclude Rasmussen's expert testimony. (Rec. 
at 1171-1180.) 
iii. Rasmussen's Opinion That the Covenant Was 
"Worthless" Lacks Sufficient Foundation For Admission. 
Finally, if Rasmussen is wrong about allocation of the $1 Million between 
the Covenant and the Concession Contract, then the entire issue is moot as the Covenant 
26
 Under APB No. 17, this is the most significant fact in determining proper 
amortization. (Rec. at 1462, \ 27.) 
could properly be amortized over its four-year term. Rasmussen's main criticism 
regarding GCE's valuation of the Covenant is the absence of work papers. (Rec. at 1511-
1520, }^7.) This criticism is remarkable in light of the absence in Rasmussen's own work 
papers of any evidence demonstrating how he valued the Covenant. (Rec. at 1487 (depo. 
transcript at p. 162); Rec. at 1494 (depo. transcript at p. 106-108).) Indeed, the only work 
product Rasmussen generated was his signature on an affidavit drafted by Appellant's 
lawyer. Therefore, if Rasmussen is correct that an opinion about the value of a covenant 
not to compete is unreasonable without substantiating work papers, then his opinion 
about the value that should be given to the Covenant (i.e., that it is worthless or has some 
nominal value) is inadmissible. 
In addition to his lack of work papers, Rasmussen identified the "facts" upon 
which he based his opinion that the Covenant is worthless in his affidavit. Rasmussen's 
so called "facts," however, are not facts at all. Like the assumptions underlying his 
amortization opinion, the assumptions underlying his opinion that the Covenant is 
worthless are so flimsy and devoid of factual support as to lack sufficient foundation for 
admissibility. GCE will not repeat those arguments here, but rather incorporate by 
reference the relevant portions of its memorandum of points and authorities in support of 
its motion to exclude Rasmussen's expert testimony. (Rec. at 1166-1169.) 
3. Rasmussen's Opinions Concerning the Sobek Accounting Entries Are 
Unreliable and Irrelevant. 
Finally, Rasmussen contended that GCE improperly adjusted the $1.2 
Million Sobek purchase price by deducting negative retained earnings in the amount of 
$229,304. (Rec. at 1520-1521, f^ 5.) Rasmussen attempted to identify the components of 
the Sobek negative retained earnings in his affidavit. (Rec. at 1514-1515,117(b).) The 
first component Rasmussen points to is an alleged error by GCE's accountant in booking 
the asset at $1.17 Million instead of $1.20 Million, creating a difference of approximately 
$30,000. In his deposition, however, when shown the relevant financial data to which he 
had access, Rasmussen conceded that this was a mistake on his part. (Rec. at 1483 (depo. 
transcript at p. 191).) 
Rasmussen then pointed to depreciation in the amount of $59,304 for physical 
assets that had been acquired, according to Rasmussen, "approximately one month 
earlier." (Rec. at 1514-1515, ^ 7(b).) Rasmussen offered no evidence, however, that this 
depreciation violated GAAP, but rather, concedes in his own affidavit that it "may be on 
the very high end of what is allowable by generally accepted accounting principles." (Id., 
emphasis added.) Because a deduction is relevant only if it violates GAAP, the above 
concession renders Rasmussen's testimony about this depreciation item irrelevant. 
Finally, Rasmussen argued that GCE's accountant improperly recorded "a 
negative cash balance" of $140,000. (Id.) As was clear at his deposition, Rasmussen did 
not understand the $140,000 entry reflected as part of the negative retained earnings 
account. (Rec. at 1483 (depo. transcript at p. 194, 197-198).) His misunderstanding of 
this entry obviously arose from his failure to even review the agreements pursuant to 
which GCE acquired Sobek, which required GCE to book the $140,000 payment as an 
expense for previous advertising. (Rec. at 1816-1823, 1825-1839.) 
In conclusion, Rasmussen's own affidavit and deposition testimony affirmatively 
establishes that his opinions about the Arizona Tax Refund, the Covenant and the 
Concessions Contract, and the Sobek transaction are unreliable and, in most respects, 
irrelevant. As such, the trial court's failure to exclude Rasmussen's "expert" testimony 
under Rule 702 was error. 
C. THE TRIAL COURT ALSO CREATED NEW LAW BY HOLDING THE 
INDIVIDUAL APPELLEES LIABLE FOR THE CORPORATION'S 
ALLEGED BREACH OF CONTRACT. 
The trial court did not limit its effort to create new Utah law to its treatment of the 
Arizona Tax Refund. The individual Appellees moved to dismiss all claims against them 
on the grounds that the Buy-Sell Agreement was a contract between Appellant and GCE 
rather than among Appellant and all Appellees. Although Appellant argued to the 
contrary, the trial court evidently was not persuaded by Appellant's obviously strained 
reasoning as it did not cite any of Appellant's theories in support of its decision denying 
the motion for summary judgment on this ground. Instead, the court found that since this 
was a privately held, Subchapter S corporation, it would not dismiss the individual 
Appellees. (Rec. at 1748.) 
The trial court plainly erred. It is well-settled in Utah that individual shareholders 
are not liable for breach of a corporation's contracts absent exigent circumstances that do 
not exist here. Reedeker v. Salisbury, 952 P.2d 577, 582 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). There is 
no Subchapter S or "privately held corporation" exception to this rule. Individual 
Appellees, therefore, should be granted summary judgment on all claims. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
The trial court's grant of summary judgment dismissing Appellant's claims should 
be affirmed because he reached an accord and satisfaction with GCE or waived those 
claims. Alternatively, the judgment can be affirmed on the ground that Appellant was, at 
all times, an at-will employee of GCE. 
Similarly, the trial court's grant of summary judgment on Appellant's claim for 
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing as to the Buy-Sell 
Agreement should also be dismissed. Appellant reached an accord or waived those 
claims when he signed the Separation Agreement as well. Moreover, he is estopped from 
complaining of GCE's accounting practices, of which knew and approved as an officer of 
GCE, and from which he benefited as a shareholder. Additionally, the undisputed facts 
show that the net book value of GCE was determined by GCE' s accountant in 
accordance with GAAP, precisely as required by the Buy-Sell Agreement. 
The trial court properly denied Appellant's claims for punitive damages and 
attorneys' fees as a matter of law, and those decisions should also be affirmed. 
Appellant's complaint does not allege a tort claim; consequently, punitive damages are 
inappropriate. Similarly, Utah law on attorneys' fees does not support such an award 
based on the undisputed facts of this case. 
The trial court should have granted Appellee's motion for summary judgment on 
the Arizona Tax Refund. Appellant reached an accord on this claim just as on all his 
others. Additionally, the undisputed facts show that Appellees did nothing to 
intentionally deprive Appellant of his reasonable expectations as to the Arizona Tax 
Refund. Moreover, the implied covenant was extinguished upon termination of the Buy-
Sell Agreement. 
The testimony of Appellant's expert on accounting issues, in addition to being 
irrelevant, should have been deemed by the trial court as unhelpful. Finally, there is no 
basis to hold any of the Individual Appellees liable for any of Appellant's claims. The 
trial court's denial of Appellees' motion dismissing all claims against the Individual 
Appellees was in error. 
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